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WRITING COMPETITION ENTRY

When Estates Collide: A Student's Exploration of the Law of Conflicts in
Mineral Development Part I : Surface Use
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77m Univershy ofNew Mawn,
I r 17 Senford Drive, N,E.
Anurntmmr.-
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Introduction
In the American system of property, fee-simple ownership of land encompasses
ownership of a bundle of rights, each of which may be sold or leased separately.' In the case of
mineral-bearing land, when the rights to ownership and use of minerals are severed, the resulting
bundles are called "estates."* For a piece of land, there may be a surface estate, separate from
one or more subsurface oil and gas or mineral estates? A surface estate can also coexist with a
mineral estate that is surface mined, at least in the legal sense!'
The separation of estates can and does result in situations in which the interests of the
possessors are in conflict. This paper explores the substantial body of common law pertaining to
conflicts between mineral production and surface use. Traditionally, this law has unabashedly
recognized the dominance of mineral interests over the surface estate. While some jurisdictions
have adopted ameliorating doctrines through common law or by statute in recent decades, this
unequal relationship still holds fast.
In many respects and many situations, the dominance of mineral interests is justified by

the reasonable construction of leases and other conveyances. However, this paper argues that
some circumstances, the ingrained tendency of the courts to construe all ambiguity against
surface holder leads to unfair results and outcomes that are no longer congruent with policy.

'Youngs v. Old Ben Coal Co., 243 F.3d 387,388 (7th Cir. 2001), Posner, J .

'Hanis v. Currie, 178 S.W. 2d 302,304 (Tex. 1943).
%ee, e.g., Dept. of Forests &Parks v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 242 A.2d 165
(Md. 1968) (concurrent coal strip-mining and timber estates).

This is particularly true in respect to the use of high-impact (to the surface and the environment)
extraction methods such as water flooding.
A shorter companion paper explores the adjudication of conflicts between production of

multiple mineral estates attached to the same parcel of surface land, an area where non-judicial
solutions predominate.

The General Rule of Mineral Estate Dominance
When mineral estates are severed from the surface estate, the surface estate holder retains
no rights to the production or sale of granted minerals (other than possibly royalty payments, if
the severance is by lease), but the mineral rights holder effectively obtains a joint interest in the
use of the surface? With respect to this joint interest, the law has traditionally held that the rights
associated with the mineral estates dominate those of the surface estate.6 The operator of a
mineral estate is generally entitled to interfere with the use and enjoyment of the surface to
whatever extent is necessary to facilitate e x ~ a c t i o n .Thus,
~
the surface estate holder should be

SOccidentalGeothermal, Inc. v. Simmons, 543 F.Supp. 870, 876 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
61d;Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1972).

'Union Producing Co. v. Pittman , 146 So.2d 553,555 (Miss. 1962) (holding that "a grant
or reservation of minerals gives to the mineral owner the incidental rights of entering and
occupying the lands involved, and making such use of the surface thereof as is reasonably
necessary to explore, mine, remove and market the minerals therein and thereunder"); see also
Amoco Production Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d 894,896 (N.M. 1985); Sun Oil, 483
S.W.2d at 812 (overturning jury award to surface estate plaintiffs and holding that the oil and gas
lessee was entitled to use 100,000 gallons of fresh water per day to maintain pressure in its wells,
even if this negatively impacted the water available for surface agricultural use.)

prepared to accommodate ingress and egress, including road con~truction;~
construction of
surface facilities? ruinous consumption of his or her water supply;1° the despoliation of the
surface with the waste products of the subsurface operation;" and, depending on jurisdiction,
subsidence." Surface estate holders can take some comfort from the fact that the law will almost
always bar destruction of the surface through activities such as strip and open-pit mining, absent
an explicit grant of this right to the mineral estate operator.I3
Negligence, the Traditional Common Law Limit on the Right to Use the Suface
The corollary to the rule of necessary access is the "negligence principle," under which
damages may be assessed against the mineral operator when it is shown that an injury to the

'Mustang Production Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 754 F.2d 892,894 (10th Cir. 1985); Enron Oil
& Gas Co. v. Worth, 947 P.2d 610,613 (Okl. App. 1997); Amoco Production Co. v.

Thunderhead Investments, Inc., 235 F.Supp.2d 1163, 1171 (D.Colo. 2002) (allowing the
construction of gravel roads necessary to produce coal bed methane when surface estate holder
claimed this impacted its ability to develop a residential subdivision).
q h a t this is the case is obvious with regard to wells and pipelines and so forth. For a
relatively extreme example see Geothermal Kinetics, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 75
Cal.App.3d 56, 61 (1977). holding that mineral estate included the right to construct a
geothermal power facility on the surface.
''See e.g., Sun Oil, 483 S.W.2d at 812.
"See e.g., Amoco Production Co., 703 P.2d at 895-96.
I2E.g., surface estates in Pennsylvania are protected from subsidence caused by coal
mining under a statute upheld by the Supreme Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
"See e.g., Smith v. Moore, 474 P.2d 794,795 (Colo. 1970); Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas
Co., 313 N.E.2d 374 (Ohio 1974); but see Belville Min. Co. v. U.S. 999 F.2d 989,996 (6th Cir.
1993) (purporting to apply Ohio law, but holding that the right to strip mine can be inferred to
mineral deeds absent explicit language, when strip mining was in common use in the area at the
time deeds were granted).

surface estate went beyond what was needed fully produce the mineral.'" For example, in the
New Mexico case, Amoco Production Co. v. Carter Farm Co., the oil producer departed from
standard industry practices in constructing a "reserve pit" and this ultimately led to the possibility
of greater degradation to the surface estate at the termination of production than would have
normally occurred.'* The state Supreme Court, while overturning the jury's damage award for
other reasons, held that a valid negligence claim could have been founded in this case on the
"reasonableness" (or lack thereof) of Amoco's actions: "Damage to the surface estate by the
owner of the mineral estate is founded upon the unreasonable, excessive, or negligent use of the
surface estate.16

Sources and Rationale of the Law
The subordination of surface interests to the rule of necessary access to mineral rights is
arises in large part from law's imputation of expectations and intentions to the parties at the time
the mineral estate was first severed. The general intent of the parties is the same in most cases,
that being to sever the mineral and surface estates, convey the identified valuable substances to
the mineral estate owner, and to assign incidental rights as necessary to accomplish the

I4Thenegligence principle also encompasses liabilities for injuries caused by the failure
of the mineral operator to use ordinary care. See, e.g., Wells v. North East Coal Co., 118 S.W.
555 (Ky. App. 1938) (awarding damages for bodily injuries sustained by farmerllessor's son
when a rotten piece of timber fell detached from the coal operator's tramway trestle).
"703 P.2d 894,897 (N.M. 1985).
16AmocoProduction Co., 703 P.2d at 897. The court ultimately overturned the damage
award on the grounds that the cost of remediation were in excess of the property's fair market
value.
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exploitation of the mineral estate.17 But as is always the case with the law, the devil is in the
details.

Sources of Conflict
At the time of the original severance of the mineral estate from the surface, the two
parties to the transaction will necessarily be in agreement that the deal they have negotiated is
fair and beneficial to both. Yet, as the volume of litigation attests, this initially harmonious
relationship often deteriorates into conflicts. Some of these conflicts are simply the result of
unrealistic expectations on the part of the mineral estate grantee. These expectations are aptly
characterized in a 1970 law review article by Clarence Brimmer, later a federal judge:
Ranchers and farmers--almost by definition, if not by some obscure oath of
allegiance to the local county farm bureau--have a sure and certain faith that a
printed form entitled "Producers 88" is a time-tested, honorable document that
almost any prudent person would quickly sign on the tailgate of the pickup, in the
hope that either development will lead to the pot at the end of the rainbow or that
at least the annual lease rentals will defray the taxes.
All too seldom is the family lawyer asked to participate in the negotiation of the
oil lease, and frequently he only learns of his client's problems when the lessee's
development has started and his client now tells him that a big well-site is in the
middle of his best field, staked out by engineers, not farmers, in the dead of
winter, taking far more land than reasonably required, that the newly constructed
roads for heavy equipment are dividing the field so that the mowers will have
trouble, that the roads will create low spots in which water will collect and sour
the meadows, and will alter his inigation pattern, that the culverts in the road will
plug and necessitate annual cleaning, that the surface water where confined by
culverts will wash away topsoil, that fences will have to be built to keep cattle out
of the mud pits, that the lessee is using all the water that is now needed for crops
or livestock, . . .

''

"Maser v. U.S.Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1984).
Clarence A. Brimmer, The Rancher's Subservient Surface Estate, V Land & Water
L.Rev. 49.50 (1970).
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In Brimmer's vignette, the farmer's problems are mostly of his own making, as he
expressly granted surface access rights to the driller and the resulting impairments were perfectly
foreseeable under prevalent industry practices.19 More interesting, at least in the legal sense, are
conflicts between surface and mineral estate rights arising from secular changes in technologies
and markets that were not reasonably foreseeable by the parties to the original conveyance.
Changes in extractive technologies have been a fertile source of litigation. For example,
courts have had to construe the likely intent of the parties to coal estate severance instruments
that predate the development of strip mining,20and oil and gas leases predating the era of
secondary recovery using water-flooding." Litigation also erupts when a substance previously
thought to have negligible commercial value becomes desirable, as did Uranium in the 1 9 5 0 ~ ~ ~
and coalbed methane in the 1980~.~'
In these instances, courts may be required to ascertain
ownership of the resource as well as to determine the liability rules for surface damages caused
by mineral development. Finally, conflicts may also arise from unforeseen changes in the

'It should be noted that while the material excerpted suggest that Brimmer blames the
farmer's impulsiveness for all of his subsequent troubles, he also uses this vignette in as part of a
critical analysis of the asymmetric bargaining stature of the parties.
20Seecases at supra note 13.
21E.g.,Sun Oil v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Tex. 1972).
22E.g.,Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
=E.g., Amoco Prod. Co, v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865,879-80 (1999);
NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. West, 631 So.2d 212 (Ala. 1993); Newman v. Rag Wyoming
Land Co., 53 P.3d 540 (Wyo. 2002).

potential use of the surface portion of a severed estate; in particular the growing potential for
suburban residential sprawl to reach rural areas previously leased for mineral developmentF4
'

In each of these instances, adjudication of a conflict likely requires that the parties' intent

to assign respective rights be construed in the face of circumstances they did not anticipate. It
will be seen that the traditional rules for construing ambiguity in property conveyances work
against the interest of the surface estate.

Rules of Construction Favor the Mineral Estate
Mineral rights may be severed from the surface estate by two sorts of transactions. In a
"grant," the fee simple property owner of a parcel of land grants the mineral interests in that land
to a second party by lease or deed, reserving the surface estate.= In a "reservation," the mineral
interests are reserved by the original owner and the interest in the surface estate is t r a n s f e d to
the second party.

In almost all cases, the instrument granting or reserving a mineral interest will include
language explicitly giving the surface rights necessary to access to the mineral. When this
language is sufficiently specific, controversies may be resolved by giving effect to the language
within the "four comers" of the documentF6 But this rule may not be particularly helpful when

"E.g., Calvert Joint Venture #I40 v. Snider, 816 A.2d 854 (Md. 2003); Amoco
Production Co. v. Thunderhead Investments, Inc., 235 F.Supp.2d 1163, 1171 (D.Colo. 2002).
"Little, if any, distinction may be drawn between severances by deed or lease with
respect to appurtenant surface rights. A third form of conveyance, the "nonparticipating royalty
interest," gives the grantee an economic interest in another party's development of the mineral
estate, but the grantee
26Spurlockv. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 694 P.2d 299,309 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
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dealing with older instruments using very general language2' or when technological changes have
caused what was initially a specific grant to now have an ambiguous meaning.
The Restatement of Property Q 476 (concerning easements, in general) explicates two of
the rules used in constructing mineral conveyances in the face of ambiguity: construction against
the grantor and the rule of necessity. The general rule for construction of a property conveyance
is that ambiguity in language granting a right or making a reservation is to be construed against
the grantor." The rule of necessity holds that "[ilf no use can be made of land conveyed or
retained without the benefit of an easement, it is assumed that the parties intended the easement
to be ~reated."'~State in the mineral law context, the rule holds that the right to access the
mineral estate through the surface will be implied absent contrary language, "because a grant or
reservation of minerals would be wholly worthless if the grantee or reserver could not enter upon
the land in order to explore for and extract the minerals granted or r e ~ e r v e d . " ~
These two rules, construction in favor of the grantee and necessity, join forces against the

"E.g., Winnings v. Wilpen Coal Co., 59 S.E.2d 655,657 (W.Va. Ct. App. 1950) (1892
coal estate conveyance included "rights of way of ingress . . . over and through said land for the
purpose of mining said coal"); Sentry at 77 ("to make such use of the surface of the leased
premises as it may find necessary or convenient in the recovery of the leased coal.")

"Restatement of Property 5 746, comment c., see also e.g., Notch Mountain Corp. v.
Elliott, 898 P.2d 550,557 (Colo. 1995); In re Condemnation by County of Allegheny of Certain
Coal, Oil, Gas, Limestone, Mineral Properties, 719 A.2d 1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
29Restatementof Property 5 746, comment g.
''Hams v. Cume, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1944); see also MacDonnell v. Capital Co.
130 F.2d 31 1,320 (9th Cir 1942) ("There is, apparently, complete unanimity amongst the various
jurisdictions as regards the rule that an expressed mineral reservation contained in a deed cames
with it, by necessary implication, the right to remove such minerals (including gas and oil) by the
usual or customary methods of mining and thus reduce them to possession even though the
surface,ground may be wholly destroyed as a result thereof.")

interests of the surface estate in typical severance scenario in which a fee simple owner grants a
mineral interest.)' If they conflict, as in the case of a mineral estate severed by reservation, the
rule of necessity will take precedence, with the courts presuming that the person acquiring the
surface interest shall have known that only a subservient interest was being a~quired.'~
It is hard to argue that the rule of necessity is inappropriate in situations involving surface
impairments that could have been anticipated by the parties at the time of the severance. Yet its
application becomes more tenuous when it is used to justify surface holders' forbearance of
damages extractive technologies not reasonably foreseen or the development of wholly unknown
minerals included in a general conveyance.

Modifications to the Rule
This section of the paper covers three legal developments originating in the
"environmental era" of mineral law (the 1970s and 1980s). by which the general rule of absolute
dominance for mineral estates has been restricted in limited areas.

Accommodation Doctrine

"But the rule of necessity can also help the surface estate holder in some situations. E.g..
Pyramid Coal Corp. v. Pratt, 99 N.E.2d 427 (Ind. 1951) (applying the rule to allowing the surface
holder to drill through a coal seam for water).
32Andwhen neither rule of construction supports finding an implied right of access to the
surface in the conveyance, then they may be ignored. For example, in Ball v. Dillard, 602 S.W.2d
521,522 (Tex. 1980). Ball was assessed damages for interfering with Dillard's right of egress to
access his mineral estate, despite the fact that Ball acquired his interest in the use of surface
through a lease with land-owner Robinson executed one year before Robinson created a severed
mineral estate through a grant to Dillard. In coming to this conclusion, the court seems to have
construed Ball's lease in favor of the grantor, Robinson, and found that the rule of necessity
could convey rights from Ball to Dillard, parties not in privity.

Accommodation doctrine, which first arose in the early 1970s in Texas, recognizes that a
measure of respect must be paid to the surface interests ("due regard") when the mineral operator
has alternative means of extraction:
[wlhere there is an existing use by the surface owner which would otherwise be
precluded or impaired, and where under established practices in the industry there
are alternatives available to the lessee whereby minerals can be recovered, the
rules of reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption of an alternative
by the lessee." 33

In Getfy Oil v. Jones, the leading case in this area, the Texas Supreme Court held that an
oil well operator should have used below-grade pumping units so as not to unduly interfere with
the surface holder's self-propelled sprinkler irrigation system.% While it would have been more
costly for Getty to locate its pumps below-grade (an estimate of $12,000 is cited in the opinion),
there was also evidence that maintenance costs would have been lower."
But only one year later, in Sun Oil v. Whiraker, the Texas Supreme Court limited the
alternative means of production that must be considered under the accommodation doctrine to
those available "on the leased premises."36 On this basis, the Sun Oil majority (who had been in
the dissent in Getfy Oil) held that requiring Sun to purchase offsite water for its secondary
extraction program was not a "reasonable alternative method" of production and would be a
"derogation of the dominant estate."" This despite factual findings by a jury below that Sun's

33 Tarrant

County Water Control and Imp. Dist. No. One v. Haupt, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 909,
91 1 (Tex. 1993) (emphasis added).
)4470 S.W. 2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
"Id. at 622.
%483S.W.2d 808,812 (Tex. 1972).
"Id.
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pumping from the aquifer would substantially reduce the potable water available for the surface
holder's existing agricultural use and that at the time of the original lease, the parties "did not
contemplate or intend that large quantities of water would be used for [oil extra~tion]."'~
The ostensible basis for the holding in Sun Oil was rereading Get0 as being limited to
onsite alternative^,'^ however, it seems likely that the possibility of the law requiring costly
alternative methods was sufficient to persuade the swing vote on the Texas Supreme Court to
restate the law in narrower terms.40 Several jurisdictions have followed Texas in adopting
accommodation as a legal standard, including Arkansas," Utah:'

North DakotaT4'Alaska," and

I9But see id. at 820 (Daniels, J., dissenting) (Getty's "rationale is not limited to reasonable
alternatives located on the leased premises").
401'heTexas Court originally voted to affirm the district and appellate courts in finding for
the landowner in an opinion reported at 15 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 60 (1971). This opinion was reversed
on rehearing, after one justice, who had earlier recused himself on account of a prior personal oil
lessor relationship with Sun, was determined to be sufficiently free from partiality to break a
four-four tie. 483 S.W. 2d at 823.
41DiamondShamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 51 1 S.W.2d 160 (Ark. 1974) (oil driller held
liable for damages when it located a well precisely at the planned location of the surface owner
family home, despite the availability of an alternative drilling site that was equally good); see
also McFarland v. Taylor, 65 S.W.3d 468 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) (oil operator enjoined from using
road with preexisting residential use when alternative route available with the expenditure of
$1,500).
42FlyingDiamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976) (mineral lessee held liable for
value of land lost to agricultural production by road, when available alternative routing would
have been less damaging to surface interests).
43HuntOil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131,136 (N.D. 1979) (applying accommodation
to hold against compensating surface estate when surface estate failed to prove the availability of
reasonable alternatives to mineral lessee's seismic operations).
"Hayes v. A.J. Associates, Inc., 960 P.2d 556,574 (Alaska 1998).
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West Virginia!'

(Nevertheless, it clearly remains a minority rule.")

While these jurisdictions do

not necessarily recognize the onsiteloffsite distinction from Sun Oil, the reported cases tend to
suggest that the accommodations that will be required are those of modest expense and
inconvenience to the mineral operator.
Aspects of accommodation doctrine are easily confused with the more traditional
negligence principle of mineral law, as expressed in cases such as Carter Farms, supra, yet there
are key differences."

As Carter Farms illustrates, the negligence principle finds liability when

the mineral operator fails to take ordinary care and thus causes extraordinary damage to the
surface. The standard of care is set by industry practices and the mineral operator is not expected
to incur any additional expense or inconvenience in deference to the surface interest^!^ Under
negligence, surface use will be considered for the valuation of damages, but is not a key factor in
establishing liability. In contrast, under the accommodation doctrine, the particular surface use is
a critical factor in the analysis; the mineral owner is limited to exercising its rights of access to
conduct "reasonably necessary for that purpose and consistent with allowing the fee owner the

"Buffalo Min. Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721 (W.Va. 1980) (opinion expressly states
adoption of accommodation doctrine, but does not apply it in holding against surface holder
claiming injury from mining company's placement of power lines).
'?arrant

County Water District, 854 S.W.2d at 911, n.3.

47

See, e.g., Christopher Alspach, Surface Use by the Mineral Owner: How Much
Accommodation is Required, 55 Okla. L. Rev. 89, 100-01 (2002) (construing Carter Farms as
New Mexico's adoption of accommodation).
48See,e.g., Sentry Royalty Co. v. Kimmel, 461 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970) (plaintiff
denied recovery for damage to home site caused by rain-induced slide of deposited mining spoils,
when lessee strip mining operator's deposition of spoils in a potentially hazardous location was
required by its most economically advantageous plan of mining.)

greatest possible use of his property consistent there~ith.'"~Thus, given the a particular use of
the surface, the selection of an extraction method that is not intrinsically unreasonable can be
become so (as in Getty Oil, supra). And, the mineral operator is expected to incur at least
modest expense and inconvenience in order to accommodate the interests of the surface estate.

Generally Conveyed Minerals
In the 1984 case, Moser v. U.S.Steel Corp, the Texas Supreme Court held that the rule of
necessity did not shield mineral operators from liability for surface damages caused by the
extraction of minerals whose rights were obtained through a general conveyance; i.e., through
language such as "and all other minerals."s0 The court began by reviewing the general intent of
parties to a mineral conveyance:
The general intent of parties executing a mineral deed or lease is presumed to be
an intent to sever the mineral and surface estates, convey all valuable substances
to the mineral estate owner regardless of whether their presence of value was
known at the time of conveyance, and to preserve the uses incident to each
estate."
Given this general intent, the court reasoned that it could be reasonably assumed that the grantor
of a mineral estate whose exploitation is known to involve destructive activities did in fact

49RyingDiamond Corp. v. Rust, 55 1 P.2d at 5 11.

"676 S.W. 2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
"Id. at 102. For this passage and throughout Moser, the Texas court cites a 1949 law
review article, Eugene Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107
(1949). With this article, Professor Kuntz became one of the first legal scholars to recognize that
the question of ownership of a particular mineral right was separate from the question of the
extent of mineral owner's right to use and damage the surface. Daniel Gibbons, In Memoriam:
Eugene Kuntz, 48 Okla. L. Rev. xi, xii (1995). A widely recognized authority in the field of
mineral law, Professor Kuntz' writings have been cited in well over 200 cases around the
country, including three U.S.Supreme Court opinions. Id.

anticipate the impairment of the retained surface estate (a case of applying the rule of
nece~sity)?~
And that the value of that diminution of the surface estate was included in the price
charged for the mineral rights." According to the court, this is the situation with a specifically
conveyed mineral, and so the mineral operator is exempted from further compensation to the
surface owner holder for damage to the surface, absent negligence." On the other hand, the
grantor of a rights to extract unknown substances in general conveyance would not have been on
notice as to the potential impact on the retained surface estate?' In this instance, permanent
damage to the surface estate is compen~able?~
Applying this law to the case at bar, the Moser court held that the operator of a uranium
mine pursuant to a general mineral conveyance would be required to compensate the holder of
the surface estate for any permanent damage to the surface, without regard to negligence." But
even in holding that the surface estate owner be compensated for permanent damages that were

"Because it was a significant change from settled Texas law, the court majority elected to
only apply its holding on compensation prospectively and not grant relief to the Mosers in the
case at bar. Id. This case was actually before the court as an action to quiet title to the uranium
deposit. Then-existing Texas common law had been that minerals whose extraction required
substantial surface destruction were not included in a general mineral conveyance, and thus were
retained with the surface estate. Id. at 101. This approach had proven difficult to apply and was
resulting in uncertainty in the title to minerals in the state. Id. The court crafted a two-part
replacement, holding that henceforth, the ordinary meaning of "other minerals" should control
ownership, and the issue of surface damages be dealt with by the new liability rule discussed
herein.

not cognizable at the time of the mineral grant, the surface estate was still required to
accommodate any and all transitory activities required to extract the generally-conveyed
minerals, without additional compensation.58
Thus, in Moser we see an explanation for the dominance of mineral rights interests over
the surface holder's interests - the rights to unimpaired use of the surface were bargained away
for compensation. We also see a refinement to the traditional doctrine calling for a special rule
in one circumstance where surface damages could not have been anticipated at the time of the
original mineral conveyance. This same logic could have - but has not - been applied to the
circumstance of surface damages arising from the extraction of a specifically-conveyed mineral
by means technologies that were unknown and unanticipated at the time of con~eyance.'~

Post-Production Remediation Required by Common Law or Statute
The rule of Moser regarding generally-conveyed minerals required compensation for
permanent damages. Along these same lines, at least two jurisdictions have produced court
decisions requiring post-production remediation of drilling sites. In addition, nine states have
enacted legislation in the past two decades increasing the liability of mineral interest holders for
surface damages."
The Arkansas Supreme Court, in Bonds v. Sanchez-O'Brien Oil & Gas Co., held that an

"Note, the four dissenting justices in water flooding case Sun Oil v. Whitaker,483
S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972) would have created a rule excluding
- the surface use related to
unanticipated extraction technologies from the implied grant of rights to the mineral estate.
"Christopher Alspach, Surface Use by the Mineral Owner: How Much Accommodation
is Required, 55 Okla. L. Rev. 89, 110 (2002).

oil and gas lessee had an implied duty to restore the surface to its condition prior to drilling, to
the extent practicable!'

The court's position was that it is just as easy to infer an intent to restore,

when leases are silent, as it is to make the traditional inference that the retainer of the surface
estate had the intent and expectation that his or her estate was to be permanently impaired.
Oklahoma came to a similar conclusion that restoration was required in Tenneco Oil Co. v. Allen,
In that case, the impositions on the surface estate holder,
based on nuisance and negligen~e.~'

including the failure to remove equipment and seal wells after production terminated, were
compensable because they went beyond what was necessary for the production of oil.
Notwithstanding these two examples, surface holders' right to restoration, absent explicit
contractual or statutory requirements, is a minority rule!'

Discussion
Two versions of the rule of necessity are present in mineral law. One version, eminently
supportable, is a rule of construction for ambiguous conveyances to get at the implied intent of
the parties. Necessity as a rule of construction is inherently limited to what is foreseeable by the

"715 S.W.2d 444 (Ark. 1986).
62515P.2d 1391 (Okl. 1973).
63Bonds,715 S.W.2d at 446-47 (Newbern, J., dissenting). Indeed, even when remediation
is contractually reserved, the surface holder may still be left uncompensated for damages under
the principle of the famous case Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Min. Co. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla.
1963) (holding that specific performance shall not be awarded in a breach of contract suit when
the value of the restored land is less than the cost of remediation). In Youngs v. Old Ben Coal
Co., 243 F.3d 387,392 (7th Cir. 2001). Judge Posner cited the Peevyhouse holding as an
alternative basis for denying plaintiffs claims for the cost to remove oil equipment from his land.
But see, Davis v. Shell Oil Co., 795 F.Supp. 381,385 (W.D.Okl. 1992) (Peevyhouse has not been
good law in Oklahoma for at least 20 years).

parties: when A granted B the rights to the oil under A's land, A must have foreseen the necessity
of drilling rigs, pumps, pipelines, etc., and so we will imply these rights of surface use even if
omitted from the conveyance.
The second version of the rule of necessity is the one in which implicit economic policy
is used as the basis to resolve a conflict in favor of the mineral estate holder in a situation in
which the original parties could not have had an intent. This version of the rule of necessity
supports the right to impair the surface estate in the pursuit of secondary recovery operations not
foreseeable at the time of the mineral estate's severance6" or through unanticipated innovations
such as the long-wall method of coal mining.65 Dominance is imputed to the minerals portion of
all severed estates because "[plractically speaking, the mineral estate would be wholly worthless
if the owner of the minerals could not enter upon the land in order to

. . . extract them.'%

Is a Dominant Mineral Estate Economically Efficient?
The implicit economic rationale of second version of the rule of necessity is the
promotion of mineral development: we have to make costs as low as possible to the operator, or
else the minerals will sit in the ground This is the same poorly thought-out economic hypothesis
that led to the enactment of the Mining Act of 1872, which continues to grant private operators

Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972) (water flooding); see also
Buffalo Min. Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721 (W.Va. 1980) (coal operator had right to place
electric power lines even though parties to 19Ihcentury mineral grant had no appreciation of this
possibility).
"Smerdell v. Consolidation Coal Co., 806 F.Supp. 1278 (N.D.W.Va. 1992.) (waiver of
subadjacent support not invalidated by subsequent development of long wall mining).
66PlainsmanTrading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786,788-89 (Tex 1995).

free mining rights to certain minerals on federal lands?' When resources are given away at no
cost, be they mineral rights or the right to use excessive surface resources, this creates the
potential for economically sub-optimal outcomes. Surface access at no cost is not a necessary
requisite to economically advantageous mineral development
The premise that a mineral estate is worthless without surface access rights is hyperbole.
Ownership without access does have value. Elsewhere in property law, it is firmly established
that the right to exclude others is valuable in and of itself. 'The right to exclude others is one of
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.""
Transferred to the mineral law context, ownership of the right to exclude implies that, even if a
mineral grantee was permanently and irreversibly barred from ever producing for its own benefit
a proven mineral reserve, the estate still has value that the surface holder would pay to regain the
right to utilize the mineral.
For the sake of argument, assume this situation prevailed, and that mineral grants came
with no rights of surface use or access im~lied.6~
A mineral rights holder with a verified find
would then be forced to negotiate with the surface estate holder for the infringement on the
surface estate necessary to accomplish the actual mode of production. The price arrived upon

6730U.S.C. $5 21-42.
68Dolanv. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994).
69Thereare actually several reported cases involving mineral conveyances in which
surface use rights were explicitly withheld. E.g., Hancock Oil Co. v. Meeker-Gamer Oil Co.,
257 P.2d 988 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (intent may have been to allow extraction from wells on
adjacent property); Reed v. Williamson, 82 N.W.2d 18 (Neb. 1957) (collecting and following
cases in which restrictive residential property covenants were disregarded in favor of finding a
right of necessary access to a subadjacent mineral estate); Sellars v. Ohio Valley Tmst Co., 248
S.W.2d 897 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
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would be based on the relative value of the resource, the amount of infringement on the surface
estate desired, and on the contemporary value of the surface estate for other uses. In such a legal
regime, minerals would still be extracted when that was the most economically productive use of
the land?'

The only difference between outcomes in this hypothetical legal regime and the

traditional legal view is which party accrues the bulk of the profits?1

If mineral development is theoretically possible with all of the liability for surface
damage shifted to the producer, it must also be possible under a liberalization of liability rules in
circumstances where the surface estate impact is significantly different from what the parties
expected at the time of the severance. Such a change would correct the inverse distribution of
risk and reward, making it more congruent with generally accepted economic policy; i.e., the
surface estate would no longer bear all of the risk of unforeseeable impairment, while the mineral
estate accrued most of the rewards.

70SeeRonald H . Coase, f i e Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960)
(demonstrating that, absent high transaction costs, the initial allocation of ownership rights has
no effect on the economically productive use of property).
"There is a range of prices for surface access rights at which it is still profitable for the
mineral estate holder to agree to such a deal in order to extract the resources that it owns. In the
property rights world we are imagining, the normal rules of economics suggest that the mineral
operator will go up to the high end of that range if necessary to secure the consent of the surface
estate holder, and further that such assent will be forthcoming except in those instances where the
value of the unimpaired surface estate exceeds the value of the minerals. Thus, in the end,
subsurface minerals will be produced and made available to the market whenever their value
exceeds that of the injury to the surface estate.
Coase's theorem predicts that the same result will obtain under the current allocation of
property rights - if the the value of an unimpaired surface estate is great enough to the surface
estate owner, he or she will be willing and able to pay the mineral operator not to produce. For
example, the residential developers in Thunderhead lnvesmzenrs (supra note 8.24). should have
been willing to pay the oil operator not to build roads or locate drilling apparatus on their land, at
an amount up to what they believed the diminution in value of the housing.
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Historical Antecedents of the Dominant Mineral Estate Version of the Rule of Necessary Access
A plausible explanation for the historical origins of the traditional and irrational
dominance of mineral estates in American common law is suggested by Judge Daniel's dissent in
Sun Oil: it is a holdover from "the days when all minerals were royal patrimonies owned by the

sovereign crown or state.'"'

For both of the dominant colonial powers in the New World,

England and Spain, the right to ownership of subsurface minerals was a privilege reserved to the
crown.73 As with all such royal privileges, "the sovereign's separate and severed mineral
ownership on private lands rendered the surface estate servient and subject to any use the King
might find necessary to mine for and produce the minerals on or beneath the lands of his
subjects.""

In Texas, at least, this aspect of Spanish mineral law was initially received without much
thought as to how it fit with republican principles, and thus for a time, the State legally owned all
minerals?'

Subsequently, in the Texas Constitution of 1866, the state transferred its mineral

rights to the private owners of the land.76 Under private ownership of minerals, surface access
rights became somewhat less absolute, but it seems that some residue of the sovereign rights of

72483S.W.2d 808, 816 (Texas 1972) (Daniels, J., dissenting).
73

Id. (focusing on Spanish mineral law received by Texas); see also Cowan v. Hardeman,
26 Tex. 217, 1862 WL 2839 *4 (1862) (collecting English common law).

"Sun Oil v. hi taker, 483 S.W.2d at 816 (Daniels, J., dissenting).
7'See Cowan, 1862 WL 2839 (allowing private ownership of the surface of land bearing

salt springs and other valuable minerals, while continue to recognize state ownership of the
minerals themselves).
:Sun

Oil v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d at 817 (Daniels, J., dissenting).

kings remains imbedded in the law?'

For example, in a 1995 opinion establishing ownership

rights to a uranium deposit, the Texas Supreme Court cited Cowan v. Hardeman, a case from the
era of state-owned minerals, as part of the line of cases establishing that "the mineral estate
would be wholly worthless" without the right to reasonable use of the surface?'

Conclusion
Whether it is a holdover from the seventeenth century orjust from the nineteenth, the
legal rule of surface right access beyond what might reasonably be imputed to the intent of the
parties to the original conveyance is increasingly archaic. This legal tradition stands opposed to
the changing economics of surface use, such as those arising from encroachment of residential
and commercial development on mineral lands. It also fails to recognize changing economics of
resources associated with the surface estate, such as water. A revised rule that shifted liability
for unforseen surface impacts to the producer would likely result in market-based, negotiated
sharing of the costs and benefits of mineral development, more in tune with the value of the
surface resources being consumed.

?d.
"Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786,788-89 (Tex. 1995).
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Introduction
The concurrent development of multiple mineral resources from the same piece of land
often presents practical problems. For example, in order to develop oil or gas reserves located
beneath a coal deposit, it is necessary to leave support pillars of undisturbed coal around each oil
or gas well, or else the wells may rupture and release hazardous substances into the coal mining
area.' Thus, the more wells that are placed in the field, the less coal that can be utilized. Similar
trade-offs occur in the concurrent development of other mined substances such as potash located
sub-adjacent to oil and gas;' in the development of coalbed methane (CBM) trapped in coal
deposits;' and even between natural gas and oil production, when the rights to these two
hydrocarbons have been "phase severed.'"
When one party possesses the rights to both competing mineral estates, the economic
trade-offs are internalized. Mineral development proceeds in the manner expected to maximize
total monetary returns from the field, based on the relative prices of the minerals and the
technical considerations. When the mineral estates are under different ownership, the trade-offs
will be determined, at least initially, by the terms of the severance instruments or by operation of
law.' This paper examines the common law rules for adjudicating conflicts in the development

'Einsig v. Pennsylvania Mines Corp., 452 A.2d 558, 563 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
'Rocky Mountain Law Foundation, 6 American Law of Mining 2d $200.04[2][b] (2002).
'Jeanine Feriancek, Coal and Coalbed Methane Development Conflicts: No Easy
Solution, 14 Nat. Resources & Env't 260,261 (2000).
4

See Ralph A. Midkiff, Phase Severance of Gas Rights from Oil Rights, 63 Tex. L. Rev.
133, 178-79 (1984) (secondary oil recovery operations may interfere with gas recovery rights).

'If the initial allocation of development rights is not economically efficient with respect to
the relative values of the minerals and so forth, Coase's Theorem predicts that the parties will
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of multiple minerals as well as the non-judicial, administrative systems in place to resolve
development conflicts occurring on government lands. Two contemporary mineral development
conflicts are examined, oil-potash in the Permian Basin of New Mexico and coalbed methane
development in Wyoming's Powder River coal basin. On this basis, some general conclusions
are made as to the proper role of courts and legislatures in involving themselves in what are
essentially private economic trade-offs.

Common Law and Other Rules for Resolution of
Development Conflicts
Development conflicts occur when the mineral estate has been subdivided and minerals
with separate possessory rights are present and commercially exploitable. These preconditions
made their first joint appearance in the United States soon after the drilling of the country's first
oil well in Western Pennsylvania in 1859.6 Oil exploration quickly spread through the region,
already the center of U.S. coal de~elopment.~
Many of these new oil developers found
themselves drilling through coal deposits and coal mines.'
The earliest reported litigation involving a mineral development conflict is likely the

negotiate a reallocation that maximizes the total value of production, absent high transaction
costs. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). But even if
overall inefficiency is avoided, the initial legal allocation of rights will determine how the profits
from mineral development are distributed.
6Fred Bosselman. Jim Rossi & Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Energy, Economics and the
Environment 3 15 (2000).

'Id. at 234-36.

'E.g., Rend v. Venture Oil Co. 48 F. 248,250 (C.C. Pa. 1891) (affidavit in the record
claimed that 50,000 wells had been drilled through coal and coal mines since the discovery of
oil).
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1885 case Jefferson Iron Works v. Gill Bros., in which a natural gas lessee was enjoined from
drilling through a coal estate that was being mined under a grant of mineral rights predating the
commercialization of petroleum? In granting the injunction, the court cited the threat to the
safety of the coal miners and the lack of an explicit reservation of access rights to sub-adjacent
strata in the coal conveyance.1° However, this early case is an anomaly, with virtually all
subsequent cases coming to a different conclusion and allowing some right of access through
coal to reach sub-adjacent oil and gas deposits under similar circumstances."
The legal grounds for accommodating concurrent production of subadjacent mineral
resources were first developed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Chartiers Block Coal Co.

v. Mellon," generally considered to be the leading case in this area. As in the other early cases,
this dispute came to the court on the coal lessee's request to enjoin the defendant from drilling
through the coal bearing strata to reach its oil and gas estate.13 According to the plaintiff, "it was
impossible for such wells to be drilled in such a manner as to allow the removal of all the coal
without exposing the mine to leakage from gas from said wells, and rendering the mine
operations so hazardous to plaintiffs property and plaintiffs employees as to very greatly injure
and depreciate the value of said coal property."14 Although the surface owner, in conveying the

'9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 481 (1885).
'OId.
"See 25 A.L.R.2d 1250 (1952) (discussing and collecting cases).
'25 A. 597 (Pa. 1893).
')Id. at 597.
14zd.
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coal estate in 1881, had not resewed any right of way privileges through the coal to reach any
substances which might have been located in the strata below, the lower court denied the
requested injunction under a theory of necessity.''

The lower court did however, require the oil

operator to post a $10,000 bond against damages that might result from a mishap.I6
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the court below in denying injunctive relief, but
split four to three on the rationale and the extent to which rights were to be allocated amongst the
parties.I7 The majority found a right of access to strata below the coal estate, reasoning that the
coal estate meant ownership rights to the coal itself (and appurtenant rights), not permanent
ownership rights to the strata in which the coal was located.I8 On the other hand, the majority
recognized that necessity failed as a rule of construction when applied against the purchaser of
the coal estate,19 and thus was reluctant to accord the oil operator the right to make all necessary
use of the coal estate, with no liability for impairment t h e r e ~ f .Lastly,
~
the majority was very
concerned about what it perceived to be the economic policy implications of allowing injunctive
relief that might place valuable mineral deposits beyond reach:
Coal, oil, gas, and iron are absolutely essential to our common comfort and

17Kemmererv. Midland Oil & Drilling Co., 229 F. 872, 875 (8th Cir. 1915) (examining
Chartiers Block Coal Co.).
Ischartiers Block Coal Co, 25 A. at 598-99.
I91d. at 598 (distinguishing the traditional mineral grantee's rights of necessary surface
access from the question presented in "the right of the vendor to reach strata underlying a
stratum which he has conveyed to another."
201d.at 599 ('We do not see our way clear to apply the doctrine of a surface right of way
of necessity to the facts of this case.")
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prosperity. To place them beyond the reach of the public would be a great public
wrong. Abounding, as our state does, with these mineral treasures, so essential to
our common prosperity, the question we are considering becomes of a quasi
public character."
On these bases, the majority declined to bring the power of equity to bear against the oil
operator, but allowed for the possibility that the coal estate could obtain a remedy at law for any
damages that might actually be su~tained.'~It further suggested that the legislature would be a
more appropriate body to decide the extent to which traditional surface access rules (which allow
necessary access without additional compensation) should be applied to underlying strata.I3
Three justices joined a concurring opinion that would have sustained stronger rights of
access through intermediate mineral strata." From an analysis of the law of subadjacent support,
the concurring justices derived the principle that reciprocal rights of access always inherently
exist between possessors of subadjacent estates.= The concurring justices criticized the majority
for failing to fully take to heart its own finding of a right of access to the oil strata below the coal
estate when it placed the oil operator at risk of lawsuits.26
Courts, including the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, have largely followed the Chartiers
concurrence, and not the majority, to find a broad right of access in subsequent mineral

22~d.
("The right may be suspended during the operation of the removal of the coal to the
extent of preventing any wanton interference with the coal mining, and for every necessary
interference with it the surface owner must respond in damages.")

z41d.at 600 (Williams, J. concurring).

=Id.
261d.at 600-01 (Williams, J, concurring).

development ~ a s e s . 2However,
~
even though the practical issues of safety and economic tradeoffs posed by Chartiers Coal Co. continue to be present in the fieldin there are actually few
subsequent reported opinions in which petroleum-coal development conflicts have been resolved
by common
The absence of a large body of case law on concurrent mineral estate development
conflicts is likely due to the development of alternative avenues for dispute resolution as the
extractive industries matured through the Twentieth Century. These alternatives include the
development of statutory rules for conflict resolution, the use of non-judicial administrative
processes to resolve conflicts between concurrent mineral lessees on land managed by the federal
government or a state, and, following the prediction of economic theory, the willingness of
companies in the field to adopt formal (contractual) and informal negotiated rules for conflict
resolution.

Non-Judicial Methods of Resolving Development Conflicts
Statutory Rules

27E.g.,Telford et Al. V. Jenning Producing Co., 203 F. 456 (7th Cir. 1913); Pennsylvania
Central Brewing Co. v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co.. 95 A. 471 (Penn. 1915) (awarding damages
against coal company for its destruction of an artesian well bore passing through the coal seam);
Richardson v. Citizens Gas and Coke Utility, 422 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (owner of gas
rights located underneath coal did not need to compensate coal estate for value of coal lost to
300' safety zone required for each well bore); see also 25 A.L.R. 1250 (1952) (commenting that
even Pennsylvania courts have tended to follow the broader holding of the concurring judges in
Chartiers.)
"See e.g., Einsig v. Pennsylvania Mines Corp., 452 A.2d 558,563 (Pa. Commw. Ct.

1982).
"See 25 A.L.R.2d 1250 (1952) (collecting only eight cases subsequent to Chartiers).

Pennsylvania eventually followed the suggestion of the Chartiers majority to enact
statutory rules guiding the development of oil and gas in areas being worked for coal. In the Gas
Operations Well Drilling Petroleum and Coal Mining Act of 1955, the legislature balanced the
right of oil and gas operators to have necessary access to their estates with coal interests, using an
administrative well-permitting pn)cess.'" Under the permit rules, coal operators are notified of
proposed drilling locations and have the right to object to the permit application for any oil well
they believe may 'knduly interfere with or endanger" a mine?' On the other side, the statute
provides an equivalent administrative process to secure the agreement of the parties on the
required diameter for the support pillars that the coal operator must leave around each well
bore."

Private Agreements and "Rules of Patch"
Another factor contributing to a paucity of multiple mineral case law is the apparently
common practice for concurrent operators to enter into private agreements delineating the
respective rights and duties of the parties. The Rocky Mountain Law Foundation treatise

American Law of Mining presents one such private agreement between a federal coal lessee and
an oil and gas lessee in which the oil and gas lessee agreed to work around the coal operator, so
long as the coal operator did not hold a particular area for more than one year."

M52P.S. $5 2201-03, repealed 1984 and replaced by statutes at 58 P.S. 1601 er seq.
"Id.
"52 P.S. 5 2203, repealed, now at 58 P.S. 1601.214. The statute provides that, should
the parties be unable to come to an agreement, the Department of Environmental Resources
should require a support pillar diameter of 100 feet, or 150 feet in unusual circumstances. Id.
I3RockyMountain Law Foundation, 6 American Law ofMining 2d $200.04[2][dJ[ii]
(2002).
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Informal agreements and customs may also arise. In one area of Pennsylvania, an
"association" of well drillers agreed with their coal mining counterparts that they would only drill
on 1,000 foot or greater centers, so as to make it economically feasible for the coal operators to
work their beds while leaving adequate support pillars for the oil equipment. In return, the coal
companies would not challenge the drillers' applications for state permits."

Administrative Remedies

As the Pennsylvania statute discussed earlier, governments may adopt administrative
proceedings as an effective means of resolving economic conflicts between concurrent mineral
operators on private land. This is also the case with regard to conflicts potentially arising on land
owned by the federal government or a state government, when it is leased for mineral
development. The two most important mineral development conflicts (measured by volume of
law review articles, at least) in the past 20 years, Oil-Potash and Coal-CBM, are both principally
identified with federally-managed western lands.
When minerals are developed on government land, the mineral estate is by virtue of a
lease between a government agency and the operator. For at least 50 years, federal mineral law
has emphasized that agencies controlling the land (e.g., the BLM) act to maximize multiple use.
For example, a section in the Multiple Minerals Development Act of 1954 tells agencies that
Any mining operations . . . shall be conducted, so far as reasonably practicable, in
a manner which will avoid damage to any known deposit of any Leasing Act
mineral. . . .mining operations shall be so conducted as not to endanger or
materially interfere with any existing surface or underground improvements,
workings, or facilities which may have been made for the purpose of Leasing Act

"Einsig, 452 A.2d 356, n.4
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operations, or with the utilization of such improvements, workings, or facilities."
Multiple use maximization is also a key theme in the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976,)6 which is the BLM's organic act. Regulations promulgated under this
Act, such as those at 43 C.F.R.

$5 3161.2 and 3484 (pertaining concurrent coal and oil and gas

lessees) confer authority upon the government land manager to direct lessees to take adjust their
conduct to maximize safety and respect for other resources. The terns of federal leases require
the lessee to be bound by these and other regulations. Following this general policy, in February
2000 the BLM issued a directive to the field to begin requiring concurrent coal and CBM lessees
to enter into cooperative agreements under agency supervision."

Potash Development in New Mexico
The federal rules for oil and gas operations on potash-beating3' lands in the Petmian
Basin of New Mexico presents a special case of administrative management of concurrent
mineral operations, meriting extended discussion because of its local interest and because a
recent case in this area highlights the problems that arise when regulatory "solutions" are
imposed that tun counter to market forces.
The federal interest in potash development in New Mexico dates back to at least 1939,
when the Secretary of Interior reserved 42,000 acres of potash-bearing federal land (the "Potash

"30 U.S.C. 1 526(b).
36

43 U.S.C. $ 1701 er seq.

"Feriancek, n. 2, 15 supra at 261.
"Potash is an ore form of potassium, used in the production of fertilizer.
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Area") from the normal leasing provisions of the federal mineral laws then in effect."

In 1975,

the Secretary issued rules governing the development of oil and gas resources in the Potash Area;
these rules were substantially retained when the Secretary published the current 1986 Potash
Order."
The exploration and production of oil and gas in potash mining areas can potentially
create hazardous conditions if subsidence caused by potash mining causes a well bore to shear
and oil and gas are released."' This in turn creates an economic conflict between the respective
operators. Our Judge Conway recently characterized the conflict as follows:
The land near the Eddy County and Lea County border due east of Carlsbad, New
Mexico, is doubly blessed by being rich in two natural resources, potash and oil
and gas. The potash in this region may be mined by conventional underground
mining techniques. The oil and gas are located much further beneath the earth and
may be extracted through wells drilled through the potash zones. Potash mining
requires years of lead time before production can begin. Oil and gas wells can be
placed in production more quickly. The inherent conflict lies here: although it
makes economic sense to extract oil and gas before the potash is mined, oil and
gas drilling through potash may create safety hazards when the potash is
eventually mined, may increase the costs required to mine the potash, and may
reduce the ultimate amount of potash that is recovered if the potash is mined.
Potash interests wish to restrict or prevent oil and gas drilling near potash leases,
while oil and gas interests seek drilling permits near potash leases?'
Under the 1975 and 1986 federal rules, the public interest in maximizing multiple use of
the land is achieved through a leasing and development regime that prioritizes the recovery of

39DevonEnergy Corp. v. U.S., 45 Fed.CI. 519,522 (1999); Dept. of the Interior Notice,
Oil. Gas and Potash Leasing and Development Within the Designated Potash Area of Eddy and
Lea Counries, New Mexico, 51 FR 39425 (1986) (hereinafter 1986 Potash Order).
"Lkvon Energy Corp., 45 Fed.CI. at 522.
41RockyMountain Law Foundation, 6 American Law of Mining 2d $200.04[2][b] (2002).
421MCKalium Carlsbad, Inc. v. Babbitt, 32 F.Supp.2d 1264 (D.N.M.,1999), rev'd206
F.3d 1003 (10th Cir 200)

potash. Oil and gas operators are not permitted to drill where in locations that will interfere with
the mining and recovery of potash deposits, nor cause undue waste of potash or pose a hazard to
potash operators.43 While potash operators have some reciprocal restrictions on leases that might
interfere with existing oil wells," the order goes on to explicitly establish priorities: The BLM is
directed to inventory potash enclaves containing commercially viable deposits of the ore, in
which "lilt is the policy of the Department of the Interior to deny approval of most applications
for permits to drill oil and gas test wells from surface location^."^^ The order provides an
exception to allow drilling in a viable potash area when there is no other way of reaching an oil
deposit, but even this exception is limited to areas in which no potash mining is scheduled for
three years.46 It appears that exceptions under this provision are severely restricted in practice."
Mineral leases and applications for mining and drilling plans under the 1986 Potash
Order are under the control of BLM staff. Parties may appeal adverse decisions to the Interior
Board of Land Appeals (IBLA).~'The LBLA's ruling may be appealed in federal district court.'9

431986Potash Order at IILA.

47

See Devon Energy Corp., 45 Fed.Cl. at 528 ("Under the Potash Order, and consistent
with BLM's denial of plaintiffs' prior APDs, any proposed wells piercing mineable potash
resources would be denied. As the government concedes, potash is presumed to exist throughout
the entire Potash Area, and drilling is severely restricted in the potash enclave and in MLR areas
and buffer zones.")

"IMC Kalium Carlsbad, Inc. v. Interior Board of Land Appeals, 206 F.3d 1003, 1005
(10th Cir. 2000).
49Seeid.

A party may also appeal an adverse BLM decision directly in federal court, without first
exhausting its appeal rights with the IBLA?'
IMC Kalium Carlsbad, Inc. v. Interior Board of land Appeals

It is fairly safe to assume that oil operators in Southeastern New Mexico do not appreciate
the current regulatory regime?' While it also may be presumed that the government^'^^ original
intent in developing the rules for the Potash Area was to maximize economic development,
resource economics change over time. The facts of a recent case from the Potash Area suggest
that the goal of maximizing economic development and returns is being now being impeded by
the rigid management rules in place.
IMC Kalium Carlsbad. Inc. v. Interior Board of land Appeals tells a story in which two

oil operators active in the area, Yates Petroleum Co. and Pogo Producing Co. (YatedPogo),
formed a joint venture 1992 to bid on the potash rights for 5,280 acres." The oil companies'
strategy was to gain control over the generation of potash deposit information (quantity and grade
estimates, and so forth) that would be used to circumscribe the area which could be developed for
oil."

They reasoned that purchasing the potash leases would be more cost-effective than the

alternative method of securing drilling permits, which based on experience they believed would

"Devon Energy Corp., 45 Fed.Cl. at 529-30.
"See e.g., id., a case in which an oil driller is raising breach of contract and constitutional
takings claims against the BLM for preventing it from developing the oil resources it leased.

"The state of New Mexico has a role in the management of the Potash Area, as well.

s4Seeid. at 1007 (reprinting a memo from YatedPogo geologic consultant to Yate's
management).
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require litigating the potash operator's data."
YatesRogo was the high bidder for the leases at $6.00/acre, outbidding potash operator
M C Kalium Carlsbad by eight-five ~ e n t s . 5 But
~ upon the petition of IMC, the BLM set aside
the Yates~Pogobid, on the grounds it was made in bad faith, and awarded the leases to IMC.s7
The IBLA was more receptive to the oil companies' claim that they had a real intention to
develop the potash resources, and that they merely intended to balance the two operations, and
the appeals board re-awarded the leases to YatesPogo.5' The outcome went back and forth two
more times, with District Court Judge Conway upholding the original BLM decision and the
Tenth Circuit reversing him to give deference to the IBLA.5'
Thus, eight years later, the oil companies finally won the right to buy the dominant
mineral rights in the area, and eliminate some of the barriers to developing their own mineral
estate. Yet, even after acquiring the right to control the submission of potash deposit data and
thereby free up some locations for oil development, the oil companies are still barred from
developing areas where their own "feasibility studies using real world data"m disclose
commercially viable potash deposits. The oil companies' amelioration strategy is ultimately
grounded in the modem economics of oil and potash, in which oil's market value is much
greater. Presumably, absent the rigid rules of the government's Potash Order, oil operators
"Id.
9d.
"Id.
581d.
591d.at 1009-13.
6'Id. at 1007 (geologist consultants' memo).
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would have greater opportunities to buy the rights to develop the more economically valuable
mineral resource in the Permian Basin.

Coalbed Methane
The current hot topic in multiple minerals development is the extraction of coalbed
methane (CBM) from coal estates under control of a different patty. CBM gas is a byproduct of
the "coalification" process by which plant matter was transformed into bituminous coal millions
of years ago!'

The volume of the gas that remains embedded with the mineral coal depends on

characteristics of the particular deposit." In order for both resources to be recovered, the CBM
gas must be developed first through drilling and wells, or it will be vented and permanently lost
during the coal mining pr0cess.6~-Delaying coal extraction conflicts with the economic interests
of the coal operator and may also come into conflict with the operator's contractual or statutory

obligation^.^^ There is also the potential that some coal will be wasted because of the
interference of the former CBM wells with the maximum efficient long-wall coal mining plan.@
The coal - CBM conflict did not arise until recently. Prior to the late 1980s, when initial
development of CBM was stimulated by tax incentives, the gas was considered nothing more

61ThomasF. Darin and Amy W. Beatie, Debunking the Natural Gas "Clean Energy"
Myth: Coalbed Methane in Wyoming's Powder River Basin, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10566, 10572
(2001).

63JeanineFeriancek, Coal and Coalbed Methane Development Conflicts: No Easy
Solution, 14 Nqt. Resources & Env't 260,261 (2000).

"See Darin and Beatie, supra note 61 At 10574 (discussing CBM extraction techniques).

than an unsafe nuisance by coal operator^.^ In the past ten years, new knowledge of the extent
of CBM reserves - particularly in Wyoming's Powder River Basin - and new extractive
technologies have resulted in the recognition that CBM is a valuable resource in its own right.67
The Supreme Court, in Amoco Prod. Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, summarily
dismissed concerns that severing ownership of coal and CBM might lead to difficult to resolve
operational conflict^!^ However, practitioners are not so sanguine. In a presentation to the 2000
Rocky Mountain Law Institute, two practicing attorneys indicated that they expected a
burgeoning docket of such suits and that they had knowledge of several cases then pending in
Nevertheless, no cases of this type appear to be reported to date.

Concluding Remarks
As a general rule, regardless of the initial allocation of property rights, an economically
efficient solution can be reached if the parties are allowed to reallocate those rights through a
market or through private negotiations and these transaction costs are not too high." The justices
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Chartiers Coal Block Co. need not have been so worried
that denying the oil company the right as a matter of law to drill through the intervening coal

"526 U.S. 865,879-80 (1999).
"Patrick Day and Charles Henderson, "Getting Along or Going to Court: Ownership and
Development Conflicts Between Coalbed Methane and Coal," 10 Rocky Mt. Min. Law Inst. $
7.01 (2000); see also Feriancek, n. 3.63 supra (discussing the growing, but unrealized potential
for litigation in this area).
70Seesupra note 5 .

estate would frustrate the exploitation of petroleum reserves. With sufficiently valuable
petroleum, relative to the coal that must be wasted for well support pillars, oil companies would
have negotiated to buy the necessary rights from the coal estate, when they were otherwise
lacking." As a corollary to this rule, the experience of oil operators in the Permian Basin
demonstrates that overly rigid rules that prevent the reallocation of rights according to market
economics ultimately impair economic efficiency.
Thus, what is needed from the law are the following: First of all, by statute or common
law, clear rules must be created to determine the initial allocation of use rights (easements) when
the parties have not done so themselves. In this regard, the Supreme Court erred in Southern Ute

Tribe when it severed CBM and coal ownership rights to without also defining the usage rights.
Secondly, the initial allocation of rights should be fair. We saw in the case of
minerallsurface conflicts that the law tended to discriminate against surface interests by giving
mineral operators the right to make impairments to the surface that were not anticipated (and
bargained for) by the parties to the original conveyance. While the ability to reallocate property
rights preserves the objective of economic efficiency, an initial unfair allocation does harm to the
distribution of wealth between the parties.
Next, on a related point, the law should avoid strictures that prevent the parties from
reallocating access rights between themselves, absent a compelling public interest.
Finally, there are some public goods that are not valued in monetary terms by the market
at a level congruent with their public value. For example, post-production remediation of surface

7'Recall that in this case, the coal estate had been conveyed first, without reservation of
any rights of access. Different rules, more clearly establishing a right of access would obtain in
the situation where the oil estate was already existing at the time of the coal conveyance andlor
when such rights were explicitly reserved.

land, employee health and safety, etc. In these cases, through regulation, government may
appropriately place additional requirements on mineral operations beyond those agreed to by the
private parties to the mineral conveyance.

